Global development in the Twenty-first Century: the maturation of global development – responses to three critiques by Garnaut, Ross
Policy Quarterly – Volume 11, Issue 4 – November 2015 – Page 85
Global Development in the Twenty-
first Century: the maturation of global 
development – responses to three 
critiques
Ross Garnaut
Ross Garnaut is Professorial Research Fellow in Economics at the University of Melbourne. He was 
the 2015 Sir Frank Holmes Visiting Fellow in Policy Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. 
He has published widely on a diverse range of economic issues, including development economics, 
macroeconomics, trade policy, climate change policy, the Australian economy and China’s economic 
development.
Modern economic 
development does not travel 
for long in a straight line. 
Making sense of the periodic 
changes in direction is the 
never-ending challenge of 
economic analysis. 
My 2015 Holmes Lecture (Garnaut, 
2015b) took up the challenge of explaining 
new twists and turns in the 21st century. 
Productivity and output growth are 
markedly lower in the developed countries, 
especially but not only since the great crash 
of 2008. The populations of the developed 
countries are ageing rapidly and the labour 
forces declining or growing slowly. Global 
savings are high and investment low, 
giving rise to historically low real interest 
rates. Low business investment, despite 
the low interest rates, makes it harder 
for the developed countries to maintain 
high levels of employment. Increasing 
inequality in the distribution of income 
in the developed countries compounds 
the effects of low output growth on the 
standards of living of ordinary people. 
Increased influence by corporate money 
in the political process makes it difficult 
to correct adverse tendencies in economic 
development.
While these developments have 
generated hard times in the rich 
countries over the past decade, growth 
rates have remained reasonably strong 
in the developing countries – those low-
income countries that have their feet 
on the escalator of modern economic 
growth. Or at least remained reasonably 
strong until 2014 or 2015, when most 
large developing countries, but not India, 
experienced bumps in the development 
road. People in other low-income 
countries – the bottom billion in what I 
call the underdeveloped countries – face 
less encouraging prospects, although 
some are doing better in the 21st than in 
the last quarter of the 20th century. For as 
long as a large part of the bottom billion 
remain left behind by modern economic 
development, there is a risk that humanity 
as a whole will remain tangled in a new 
version of the Malthusian trap.
In the Holmes Lecture, I thought 
it possible that the combination of 
contemporary tendencies in economic 
development may make the maturation 
of economic growth – the achievement 
of developed-country living standards for 
most of the world’s people – possible in the 
current century. While the contemporary 
challenges to the living standards of 
ordinary people in developed countries 
were real and large, this may be simply 
a small part of a general experience of 
transition to a world of abundance for 
the necessities of life and of reduced 
inequality.
In three thoughtful responses in Policy 
Quarterly, Gary Hawke, Grant Scobie and 
Geoff Bertram have added insights and 
raised important questions.
Gary Hawke (Hawke, 2015) adds 
value to my own analysis in several ways. 
The contrast of my own conclusions 
about the association of low population 
growth with changes in income levels 
with those of Kuznets is worth noting. 
Hawke is right to point out that we 
have been surprised in the past by sharp 
changes in fertility and may be surprised 
again. The powerful association over the 
past half century between income levels 
and all that goes with them, and fertility 
nevertheless provides the base case from 
which change would have to occur. 
Hawke brings a wider literature into 
support for my generally positive view 
of humanity’s prospects of breaking the 
old nexus between economic growth and 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Hawke queries my emphasis on 
the challenge from the influence of 
corporate money to good governance 
in the public interest in the developed 
country democracies. He thinks that 
pressure from other special interests 
is similarly important. While not 
wishing to downgrade the importance 
of distortions from other interests, and 
while acknowledging that New Zealand 
may be different, it seems to me that 
the recent experience of the larger 
English-speaking countries is clearly that 
corporate investment in the democratic 
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process represents a fundamental barrier 
to dealing effectively with major public 
policy challenges. 
Gary Hawke and Grant Scobie 
(Scobie, 2015) both draw attention to the 
risks to maturation of global economic 
development from weakness in economic 
growth in China. Hawke is right to point 
out that China is so important to the 
global savings story that changes in China 
could alter prospects for the world. 
It is not possible to bring everything 
one has written on a subject into every 
new paper, so I am glad that Hawke 
has drawn attention to my discussion 
of the risks to Chinese growth in other 
published work, including Dog Days: 
Australia after the boom (Garnaut, 
2013). (For a more recent treatment, see 
Garnaut 2015a.) Scobie cites Pritchett 
and Summers (2014) as authority that 
the high rates of growth in China over 
the past three and a half decades are likely 
if not certain to give way to decisively 
lower growth. Pritchett and Summers 
point to a step down by more than half 
in rates of growth in many countries. 
They think that China’s political system 
makes it especially vulnerable. Yes, there 
is uncertainty, and other countries should 
make sure that policy settings are robust 
against the possibility of China making 
heavy weather of the transition to a new 
model of economic growth (Garnaut, Cai 
and Song, 2013; Garnaut, 2015a). But 
there are also powerful forces pushing 
to sustain Chinese growth at rates 
significantly above the global average 
until it has entered the income range of 
the developed countries in the 2020s.
Scobie says that the Holmes Lecture 
fails to acknowledge another serious 
challenge to the maturation of global 
development: the feeding of the world’s 
growing (for the time being) population. 
How do we provide food for all people 
at the standards of consumption of the 
advanced countries? I didn’t neglect the 
point altogether: the food challenge is one 
reason to be concerned about the effects 
on global fertility rates of any failure 
of development amongst the bottom 
billion. My own deep involvement in 
international agricultural research as 
chair of the boards of the Australian 
Centre for International Agricultural 
Research and then the International Food 
Policy Research Institute makes me aware 
of both the history of achievement in 
raising productivity in agriculture since 
the 1960s, and the inadequacy of current 
public investment in international 
agricultural research. But I doubt that 
food supply will be a binding constraint 
on the maturation of global development 
unless a failure of development in a 
substantial part of humanity prolongs 
high global population growth. 
Technological change may ease what 
would otherwise be a binding constraint 
on the maturation of global development 
in new and different ways. Necessity is 
the mother of invention. Rising food 
prices from large increases in demand in 
rapidly growing developing countries in 
the absence of accelerated productivity 
growth in agriculture may ease the path 
to expansion of non-agricultural food 
supply. Unpalatable as it may be for 
generations of homo sapiens accustomed 
to food from agriculture, and challenging 
though it is for food-exporting countries 
like New Zealand and Australia, the 
biological sciences are taking us towards 
synthetic substitutes for traditional food 
that at least meet nutritional requirements. 
My own personal preference for lamb and 
milk from the farm, and the preferences 
of others of my generation, whatever the 
taste of alternatives, are unlikely to be a 
decisive barrier to global development. 
Geoff Bertram (Bertram, 2015) 
challenges my preference for Keynes 
over Picketty in assessment of likely 
trends in the relationship between 
savings, investment and the distribution 
of income and wealth. Here I focus on 
three points in Bertram’s critique: the 
distinction between inequality in the 
world as a whole and among the seventh 
of humanity living in the developed 
countries; the prospects for the rate of 
return on capital returning to the high 
historical levels presumed by Picketty; 
and the importance of positional goods 
in assessment of economic welfare. 
The Holmes Lecture is about global 
inequality and not the distribution of 
incomes in the developed countries alone. 
While inequality has expanded markedly 
in the developed countries over recent 
years, it has not increased in the world 
as a whole. Figure 7 and the associated 
reference to changes in the global Gini 
coefficient make the point that Bertram 
overlooks. I do not say in the Holmes 
Lecture or elsewhere that inequality in 
developed countries is inconsequential. It 
is important to many people and it may 
determine the fate of government by, as 
well as for, the people – the democratic 
political systems that have made their 
homes in the developed countries. That 
matters a great deal to the future of 
humanity. It may or may not matter to 
the prospect for the maturation of global 
development.
On the second point, Bertram sees 
future savings and investment adjusting 
until a balance is found which leaves rates 
of return on investment at high levels. He 
gives us no better reason to expect such 
an outcome than that this has been the 
case in much earlier economic history; 
one could say most except for the globally 
golden and silver years since the Second 
World War. 
Bertram recognises that abundant 
capital kills returns. Like the neo-classical 
growth theorists, he expects the rate of 
accumulation of savings to fall in response 
to low returns on investment, to bring 
savings in line with falling investment, 
and sees natural floors to investment 
rates. 
Like Keynes, I see no reason for, and no 
sign of, low returns causing a diminution 
of the rate of savings. I see no reason to 
expect the combination of opportunities 
for investment at low interest rates, and 
depreciation, to grow more rapidly than 
savings from now on, and so raise the 
returns on low-risk investment above 
their currently negligible levels. 
It is worth noting in response to 
Bertram’s view that not only does the 
price of bonds rise with falls in the 
interest rate: the prices of other assets, 
including equities and real estate, also 
rise. As a result, falling interest rates have 
led to increases in most asset values in 
the 21st century so far, contributing a 
large part of the increases in inequality 
in the developed countries measured by 
Picketty over this period.
Bertram notes that rents for land 
and assets in fixed supply will rise with 
growth in population, and may do so 
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with growth in incomes. This is separate 
from the increases in capital incomes 
associated with reductions in interest 
rates. It is not obvious that this source 
of increase in asset values will remain 
important with the maturation of global 
development and stable or falling global 
population. 
We should make sure that we include 
in the assets in fixed supply not only land, 
but all assets that are subject to such 
restriction in supply that they generate 
increasing amounts of economic rent. 
Monopolistic and regulatory rents and 
the value of the assets which generate 
them seem to be increasingly important in 
developed countries today. The cause may 
be the increased influence of corporate 
interests over the policy-making process. 
Bertram is right to pull me up for 
dismissing too quickly inequality in 
the distribution of positional goods. 
Knowledge, literature, music, theatre 
and sport are fairly freely available 
for most people through electronic 
mechanisms, and standard social 
security arrangements make a reasonable 
minimum of most essential goods and 
services available to most people in 
the developed countries. The increased 
abundance of material comforts with the 
maturation of economic development 
would extend these advantages to most 
of humanity. But there is a danger that 
increasing corporate influence over the 
policy process will lead to access to more 
and more services being restricted behind 
private paywalls of various kinds. To 
combat such tendencies, we have to rely 
on the integrity of established democratic 
processes in the developed countries, and 
on the extension of government for the 
people to parts of the world from which 
it is currently excluded. 
I am happy to agree with Hawke, 
Scobie and Bertram that there is 
uncertainty about many of the variables 
that affect the future trajectory of global 
inequality. The Holmes Lecture asks the 
reader to consider an alternative outcome 
to that proposed by Picketty and thought 
likely by Bertram: that the maturation of 
global development will diminish rather 
than expand inequality. While I think the 
basic tendencies may turn out to resemble 
Keynes’ more closely than Picketty’s 
vision of the future, I am concerned 
enough about the remaining inequality 
to concur with Picketty’s support for 
international taxes on capital, and with his 
assertion of the crucial role of democratic 
systems in effecting the policy change 
that is necessary to maintain equity in 
distribution in individual countries and 
in the world as a whole. 
Finally, I take the opportunity to 
correct two errors in presentation in the 
original Policy Quarterly article which 
may have discouraged some readers. On 
page 10, the original text said that high 
natal masculinity was the source of a 
decline in the zero population growth 
fertility rate. It was meant to say that 
high natal masculinity was increasing the 
fertility rate that was consistent in the 
long term with zero population growth. 
And the heading of Figure 6 should read 
‘Secular trend in relative price of capital 
goods’. 
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